Quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital
Introduction
Firms compete on the basis of quality in many industries, including the hospital care industry. Hospital care is vertically differentiated by quality, and horizontally differentiated according to geographic location. Travel is costly, particularly when medical care is sought on an emergency basis. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between travel time and quality, and this tradeoff gives hospitals market power.
The hospital care industry has undergone considerable change since the early 1980s. Concerns about rising health care costs have led to a shift toward prospective reimbursement systems with reductions in reimbursement levels, while advancements in medical technology have reduced the length of inpatient stays and enabled more procedures to be done on an outpatient basis. The fall in demand for inpatient care, together with the increased pressures for cost containment, has changed the competitive environment of hospitals. These changes resulted in a consolidation of the hospital care industry throughout the 1990s.
A key issue that has arisen in attempts to assess the effects of these changes in market structure and competition, as well as in hospital antitrust cases, has been market definition (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1999; Gaynor and Vogt, 2000) . Previous studies have used geographic marketconcentration measures to estimate the effect of the competitive environment on the behavior of out of the hospital, have generally been found to affect choice as well (Luft et al., 1990) . There is also evidence that the importance of quality and distance in determining hospital choice varies across diagnoses and procedures. This article focuses solely on patients with a diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction (AMI or heart attack). 1 One issue that arises in the modelling of the hospital selection decision is the role of the physician in determining the patient's choice, and few studies have examined this. One exception is Burns and Wholey (1992) , who find that including physician characteristics (office proximity and prior utilization) substantially improves the fit of the model. This article does not include any physician characteristics. Although this is due to a lack of data, I would argue that individuals do influence the hospital they are treated in. Not only may they choose physicians on the basis of the doctor's admitting privileges, as has been pointed out by others (see Dranove, Shanley, and Simon, 1992) , they may also express preferences over hospitals directly to physicians. Furthermore, if the preferences of patients and physicians for various hospital characteristics are similar, they would both choose the same hospitals, thus the lack of physician characteristics in the model is not a serious problem.
Studies of the impact of competition on the behavior of hospitals.
A large number of articles have looked at how hospital competition affects prices, costs per inpatient day or per admission, patient health outcomes, and the adoption of new technologies or specialized services. Dranove and White (1994) , and more recently Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1999) , provide good surveys of this literature, which has remained largely separate from the hospital-choice literature. Most of these studies have measured competition based on market shares within a defined hospital market. Three approaches have generally been used to define market areas: (i) geographic areas defined by geopolitical boundaries, like counties or metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), (ii) areas based on distances between hospitals, for instance taking a 15-to 30-mile radius around each hospital as its market area, or (iii) areas based on patient migration or patient flow data.
2 Market shares are then calculated based on some measure of hospital capacity, such as the number of beds, or based on patient discharge data, and are aggregated to give an index of market concentration, most commonly, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 3 The articles that have examined the effect of competition on the technology-adoption decision of hospitals have used the above market-concentration measures, as well as counts of the number of competitors.
The approaches based on geopolitical boundaries and fixed distances assume that geographic distance alone determines the substitutability between hospitals, and hence which hospitals compete with one another, ignoring the differences in hospital quality. Using patient migration data to identify market areas allows hospital market areas to vary with hospital quality, but these measures could be biased. For instance, the data used in this article show that higher-quality hospitals tend to attract patients from further away. Hence, the measured market area for such hospitals will be larger than that of neighboring, lower-quality hospitals. This in turn implies that higher-quality hospitals will be found to have more competitors and consequently less market power than neighboring hospitals of lower quality, when in reality it is likely that the higher-quality hospital has more market power. One article that calculates Herfindahl indices using an approach that, unlike those described above, recognizes patient choice and hospital quality differences, is Kessler and McClellan (2000) . They calculate market shares based on predicted rather than actual patient flows, where predicted patient flows are estimated using a model of hospital choice. 1 Among the articles that estimate hospital choice, the one that is closest to mine in its methods and purpose is Hodgkin (1996) . It examined the effect of specialized service offerings on patient choice, addressing the medical arms race hypothesis. It uses data from a six-year period but imperfectly controls for changes in physician practice patterns over time.
2 These measures are based on the Elzinga and Hogarty (1973, 1978) approach to geographic market definition that uses the flows of goods and services to define boundaries.
3 Garnick et al. (1987) compare the three approaches and find that for the overall market perspective, MSAs generally did not coincide with the 15-mile radius or patient-flow approaches. For the individual hospital perspective, there was some overlap between the county and 15-mile radius definitions, but little overlap with the patient-origin approach.
Indices of market shares or concentration, developed to measure market power in homogeneous-products industries, are problematic when applied to differentiated-products industries. Unless substitution patterns are determined solely by market shares, measures of market concentration need not quantify the ability of particular firms to raise prices, or the incentives of firms to increase quality.
This article therefore examines competition in hospital markets by using estimated demand elasticities with respect to quality. This methodology is analogous to the technique of using demand parameters to evaluate the ability of firms to set prices in a differentiated-products industry, which is well developed in the price-competition literature (Goldberg, 1995; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995) . Shapiro (1996) discusses how diversion ratios, which can be derived from crosselasticities of demand, have been used to analyze mergers in product-differentiated industries. Each hospital is modelled as a bundle of characteristics, and valuations of different dimensions of the product space are used to estimate the substitutability between products. The next section describes the hospital care industry and explains the model of the hospital market used.
The hospital care industry
A hospital is a multiproduct firm, providing both inpatient and outpatient medical services. The range of services offered varies considerably across hospitals. Most hospital services are produced and consumed locally, although patients do travel considerable distances for certain specialized treatments like open-heart surgery or organ transplants. Consequently, the alternatives available to demanders, and the potential competitors of each producer, vary across the different hospital services. Furthermore, an increasing number of procedures are being offered on an outpatient basis by clinics and free-standing diagnostic facilities.
This article specifically examines inpatient hospital care services related to the treatment of heart attacks, using data of non-HMO Medicare patients with a primary diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction (AMI or heart attack). Heart disease is the leading cause of death in the United States, and it is one of the highest-expenditure illnesses among the elderly. Almost all diagnoses of heart attack among elderly patients lead to an admission, allowing the analysis to exclude nonhospital providers and include only inpatient services provided by short-term acutecare hospitals. Another advantage of using Medicare data is that prices are not determined by suppliers, nor do prices affect demand, enabling the analysis to focus on quality competition. Part A of Medicare insures Medicare beneficiaries for almost all the costs of inpatient care, while prospective reimbursements are fixed annually by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). Also, patient cost-sharing under Medicare does not vary by hospital. The irrelevance of prices implies that hospital care for Medicare patients is differentiated mainly along the following two dimensions:
(i) Location (horizontal product differentiation). The lapse between the occurrence of a heart attack and the delivery of treatment affects the efficacy of the treatment. This makes travel very costly, so demanders care about the travel time and hence the distance to the hospital. Medical studies have found that timely and appropriate use of existing treatments reduces mortality rates and improves outcomes, especially for patients with high risk of in-hospital death or further complications (Becker et al., 1998) . Athey and Stern (2002) found that the use of better emergency response that reduces response time, and thereby shortens the time to treatment, also leads to better patient outcomes. Finally, demanders are likely to prefer closer hospitals because their physicians, family, and friends care about travel time.
(ii) Service quality (vertical product differentiation) . The quality of care is valued not only because it may lead to better health outcomes, but also because it may improve the welfare of the patient during the process of treatment.
This differentiation implies that each hospital can be viewed as a provider of a unique location-quality product combination. Spatial differentiation of hospitals gives suppliers geographic market power, enabling lower-quality hospitals to attract patients.
The process leading to a hospital admission differs considerably among patients, as the signs and symptoms of heart attacks are variable Luepker et al., 2000; Sheifer et al., 2000; . For instance, although chest pain is widely considered a key symptom in the diagnosis of heart attack, a nationwide study showed that one-third of heart attack patients did not experience chest pains. Other symptoms include shortness of breath, sweating, nausea, and vomiting. These symptoms prompt patients to seek medical care, either contacting their physician, presenting themselves at a hospital, or calling for emergency medical services.
After the onset of symptoms, the median patient took over two hours to arrive at the hospital, with almost 30% taking longer than six hours. Only about one-third of patients who present at the hospital emergency department with chest pain arrive using emergency medical service, and about half of the patients later diagnosed with a heart attack arrive at the hospital in an ambulance. The remaining patients came via their own modes of transportation. Ideally, I would like to separate patients who arrive using emergency medical service from patients using self-transport, but this information is not available in the data. Some emergency medical services allow patients or their family some choice in hospitals, while others take them to the nearest hospital. If patients are simply taken by the ambulance to the closest hospital, distance rather than quality would be the main determinant of choice, and the empirical specification allows for this possibility. I do not have data for patients who suffered a heart attack and died before reaching a hospital, and such cases are excluded from the analysis.
Quality of hospital care is multidimensional, and demanders may value each aspect of quality differently. Measures of quality may be based on production inputs such as hospital staff and specific treatments available, as well as on patient outcomes such as mortality and complication rates. To simplify the exposition of the model and results, I distinguish between two types of input measures of quality. Ordinary service quality refers to staff-per-patient or staff-per-bed ratios, inputs that have low fixed costs associated with them and hence are relatively faster for the hospital to adjust. High-tech service quality includes the range of specialized services offered, like angioplasty or bypass surgery in the case of heart attack patients. There are large fixed costs associated with the provision of these services and, hence, increasing returns to scale in their provision. This distinction implies that the analyses of the hospital's decision to raise ordinary service quality and of its decision to raise high-tech service quality will not be identical.
Bearing in mind these features of the hospital care market, the main determinants of demand are distance (travel costs) and quality, and the tradeoff demanders make between the two. The tradeoff is represented by a utility or scoring function of the demander and it varies across demanders, depending on the severity of the illness, the frailness of the patient, and other factors that affect the willingness to travel. Each consumer purchases exactly one unit of the good, and the utility of consumer i is
where d ih denotes the distance of hospital h from patient i's home, t(d ih ) is the transport costs of travelling to hospital h, and t(·) is a function that allows distance to enter nonlinearly into U ih . Q h is a vector that includes the different aspects of the quality of hospital h, and parameter vector (α i , β i ) captures how patient i trades off quality and transport costs. We expect α i to be negative. On the supply side of the hospital care market, over half of U.S. hospitals are nonprofit organizations. 4 Nonprofit hospitals may feel committed, or socially obligated, to offer highquality care, so that quality is valued independently of profits. Nonprofits care about their profits as well, since profits may represent some break-even condition the firm must meet to stay in operation. Also, higher profits would enable the nonprofit hospital to provide more charitable care. The discussion of hospital behavior will assume profit maximization, while noting that this difference in profit status would lead nonprofit hospitals to increase quality before for-profits would.
The profit a hospital earns on both Medicare and non-Medicare patients, , is given by prices for non-Medicare patients, and C(·) is production costs, which are a function of output and quality. Since reimbursement rates are set by HCFA, hospitals choose only the quality of care offered and the prices charged to non-Medicare patients. I assume that the same quality of care is offered to both Medicare and non-Medicare patients. Nurses and other staff are unlikely to treat patients differently based on their insurance status once patients are admitted, so having more nurses per bed or offering high-tech specialized procedures will benefit all patients similarly. Firms are modelled as playing a one-shot game based on Nash conjectures. To simplify the notation, I suppress the prices and qualities of other hospitals here. The choice of ordinary service quality is determined by the first-order condition with respect to quality. I assume Medicare and non-Medicare patients value quality similarly for a given set of prices, so the demand responses of Medicare and non-Medicare patients are proportional. That is,
for some constant γ . In this case, the first-order condition simplifies to
As long as the profit made on the marginal Medicare patient, p m −∂C/∂ D m , is positive, firms will want to attract as many Medicare patients as possible. The more responsive demand is to quality (the larger ∂ D/∂ Q is), the greater the possibility that hospitals could gain market power through quality differentiation, conditional on geographic differentiation, highlighting the problem of ignoring quality differences between hospitals when assessing competition in the market. Unlike the analysis for ordinary service quality, there are indivisibilities in the adoption of new technologies. This implies that it is more appropriate to look at the discrete changes in demand and fixed costs when a hospital offers an additional service. Medicare reimbursements for heart attack patients are not completely prospective. The diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) on which payments are based vary with treatment (McClellan, 1997) , so that reimbursements per admission increase if the patients receive procedures like catheterization or revascularization. Consequently, hospital revenues will increase in two ways when additional procedures are offered. First, there will be more admissions to the hospital because demanders are attracted by the higher quality of care. This "business-stealing" or competitive effect is denoted D(adopt) and is assumed to be proportional for Medicare and non-Medicare patients as in the case of responsiveness to ordinary service quality.
5 Second, some of the patients who would have selected the hospital even without the adoption of new services will receive the additional procedures being offered, so that higher reimbursements are received on these existing patients. This latter "business-augmenting" effect is not examined in this analysis. Overall, a hospital will offer a high-tech service if the incremental profits (per-patient profit margins multiplied by patient volume) exceed the fixed costs of the new facilities, denoted FC(adopt), or
Nonprofit hospitals, which are argued to value quality independent of profits, may adopt the new technologies at lower patient volumes than for-profit hospitals. Setting up a catheterization lab or an open-heart surgery unit involves considerable fixed costs in terms of obtaining the necessary equipment and attracting specially trained cardiologists, nurses, and other staff, and these costs are considerably larger than the incremental costs per patient receiving the procedure ( FC(adopt) ∂C/∂ D), so that hospitals require a minimum volume of patients to satisfy inequality (4) and thus to offer the procedure. The increasing returns imply that average costs per patient of the procedure would be lower if all patients were treated in fewer hospitals. Hence, the Nash equilibrium of this game may lead to an inefficient outcome in which too many hospitals adopt the new technologies. Such wasteful duplication of costly facilities could result if business-stealing effects are large. 6 This article examines the incremental adoption of technologies that are already relatively well diffused, and it does not address issues about the timing of adoption. Early adopters not only are able to "steal" patients from other hospitals, but may also preempt adoption of technologies by other hospitals. Such strategic behavior is examined in detail in other articles. 
Empirical specification of the demand model
To estimate demand, I use a patient-level probabilistic choice model. Based on the framework described in the previous section, the utility function of demander i when admitted to hospital h is specified as a linear function of d ih , the geographic distance from the patient i's home to hospital h, and of various measures of hospital quality, Q h :
Both distance and quality are interacted with patient i's characteristics, Y ik , (the different characteristics are indexed by k). ξ h denotes the unobserved hospital quality and ε ih the idiosyncratic patient-hospital error. As in the previous section, Q h is a vector that includes different aspects of quality-ordinary service quality, high-tech service quality, and outcome measures of quality. The exact variables used are described in detail in Section 5. Location enters the model through the geographic distance between patient i's home and the hospital h, d ih . Travel time and costs may be hypothesized to vary nonlinearly with geographic distance, d ih , so that d ih enters utility through some function t(·), and various specifications of t(·) are tried. Given this utility specification, and distribution
is the set of unobservables that lead to hospital h being chosen. I assume that all heart attack patients are admitted to some hospital, so there is no outside good in this model. Interacting hospital characteristics and distance with patient characteristics allows the tradeoff between distance and quality to vary according to observable patient characteristics (Y ik ). From equation (5), this tradeoff is k Y ik [β k /α k ] for the th quality measure in coefficient vector β k . For instance, age can be viewed as a proxy for the frailness or the ability of the patient to travel, so that interacting age with distance allows for the possibility that younger, less frail patients are more willing to travel than are older patients.
The logit framework and identification assumptions. The model can be estimated as a logit if I assume that the unobserved hospital quality characteristics, ξ h , are small and can be ignored, and that the error term, ε ih , is i.i.d. extreme-value distributed (McFadden, 1978) . This assumption about ξ h implies that the error term will be uncorrelated with the regressors. This, together with exogeneity of the quality and distance regressors, are the main identification assumptions.
Although it is unlikely that hospital quality, as perceived by patients and physicians, is observed perfectly by the econometrician, the unobserved error, ξ h , will be small if quality differences between hospitals can be captured to a large extent by the included variables. The model includes many measures of quality. Some of these variables, like the availability of specialized services, staff-per-bed ratios, and outcome measures like mortality and complication rates, are not just indicators of hospital quality, but may also be factors that demanders observe and consciously bear in mind when selecting hospitals.
The endogeneity of product characteristics is an issue that arises in any empirical estimation of demand in any differentiated-goods market. If quality is only partially measured so that there is unobserved quality included in the error term, and the unobserved quality is correlated with the observed quality regressors, the concern is that the estimates of the quality coefficients will be biased. I am less concerned about this bias than if there were price regressors in the model. Supposing the quality measures are increasing in quality. This would result in an upward bias that would imply that the coefficients on quality were larger. If exclusion of unobserved quality variables causes the overall quality to be undermeasured, then the overestimation of the valuation of quality would offset this, and the demand responses to quality differences, which this model is used to evaluate, are not overly biased.
The correlation of various dimensions of quality in equilibrium is the result of firms setting quality based on the demand factors. Besides the correlation between included and unobserved quality that has been discussed above, other demand factors that determine quality-setting behavior could also cause endogeneity. This would include systematic differences in patient preferences for hospital characteristics. In the logit framework, it is the differences between alternative hospitals that identify the model, so that any patient-specific variables that are constant across hospital choices are differenced out and do not affect the estimation. Furthermore, the use of patient-level data also helps justify the assumption that quality is uncorrelated with the patient-hospital-specific error term, since it is only aggregate components in the error term that lead to endogeneity. Last, to the extent that changes in quality are slow to implement, quality choices of firms reflect past demand patterns rather than current demand conditions. If quality takes more than a year to adjust, then endogeneity of quality is less of a concern, as the data are drawn from only one year. The model here is static and does not deal with dynamic issues of quality adjustment.
While I would ideally like to endogenize quality choice in the estimation model, this is a very complex extension. First, there is the problem of accurately measuring quality, or quality that the firm can set. Also, the costs of changing quality must be included in the firm's maximization problem, and this requires considerable data as well as being computationally demanding. More important, the issue of what exactly the hospital maximizes-profits, quality, output, or a combination of all three-needs to be addressed for the quality choice of hospitals to be modelled, and this is contentious given that many hospitals are nonprofit. Because of these difficulties, no empirical studies that I am aware of have managed to endogenize product characteristics or quality choice of hospitals in a model of demand and supply, and I do not tackle these issues here.
Another issue that arises in estimation of hospital-choice models is whether it is high quality that attracts patients, or a high volume of patients that leads to high quality. In my sample, hospitals with higher high-tech service quality (catheterization and revascularization) are also higher-volume hospitals (Table 2 ). This issue is further complicated by findings that patients admitted to high-volume hospitals have better health outcomes (Thiemann et al., 1999) . If so, hospitals with attractive locations (for reasons unrelated to quality) gradually become high-quality hospitals over time. Despite these arguments, this article treats quality as exogenous in the choice equation, so that the causation runs from quality to choice and not in reverse.
Three features of the analysis help support the assumption that quality is exogenous. First, quality takes some time to develop, as mentioned earlier. Equipment has to be purchased and installed and staff have to be trained. This suggests that the impact of volume on quality is a function of the cumulative number of patients over the past years. Second, most hospitals in operation today were set up over 20 years ago, so that any location that was inherently attractive then may no longer be so today. Taken together, these two features would imply that a demander today is likely to be selecting a hospital based on the cumulative past volume of patients given the location of the hospital, rather than affecting hospital quality through a choice of that hospital. Finally, the regression uses the number of hospital beds rather than current hospital volume of heart attack patients as a proxy for hospital size. The correlation between the number of beds and volume in my sample is .46 and is not as high as one might expect, since hospital beds include capacity to treat many other diagnoses. One way to address this question of whether quality results in high volume or vice versa would be to use panel data with a sufficiently long time-series. With only one year of data, I do not explore these questions here.
The analysis also takes the location of patients relative to their various hospital choices as exogenous and examines how hospitals are able to attract patients and physicians through their quality choice. Most hospitals in operation today were first established in the 1970s or earlier, thus hospital locations are representative of competitive conditions at that time, and taking location in 1994 as exogenous is not an unrealistic assumption. The merger wave in the hospital industry was only starting in 1994 and reached its peak in 1997. These mergers led to the closure of some hospitals, but my 1994 data precedes this, since closures take time to implement. The relative distances of patient homes to the different hospitals in their choice-sets provide large exogenous variation among patients and help identify the parameters of the demand model.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives property of the logit.
The logit has the property that the relative probabilities of choosing any two hospitals is independent of any other available alternatives-the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). It is especially problematic when unobserved characteristics cause certain choices to be closer substitutes, so that the presence of a third alternative does change the relative probabilities of choosing two hospitals. IIA implies that the cross-elasticities of demand, with respect to any of the demand determinants, of any two hospitals j and k, with a third hospital , e j and e k , are restricted to be identical. Since I am interested in obtaining demand elasticities here, it is an important limitation.
The IIA property is the consequence of assuming the error term is independent across observations. Thus, it applies only to each homogeneous group of demanders and hospitals, rather than to the population as a whole. The model estimated here includes the location, age, gender, and race of the patient, as well as many hospital characteristics. The large variation in locations of patients and hospitals implies that there is much observed heterogeneity in the model, and the restrictive substitution patterns would only apply to patients of the same age, race, and gender who live in the same zip code. Hence, IIA is less of a concern here than in a model that uses aggregate data, includes no patient characteristics, and does not allow for any patient heterogeneity. To deal with the IIA problem, I use a random-coefficients approach explained in the next subsection. Also, I check for spatial violation of IIA by estimating the model using different geographic definitions of the set of alternative hospitals from which patients are allowed to choose, as described at the end of this section.
Random-coefficients logit or "mix-logit" framework. To allow for unobserved differences across demanders in their valuation of distance and quality, I estimate a logit with random coefficients. In the standard logit, the probability of person i choosing hospital h out of a total of H hospitals is given by 
and
Hence,
The tradeoff that patients make between distance and quality, captured by (1/α i )β i , underlies this model of demand. The above specification, which I will refer to as the "mix-logit," allows this tradeoff to vary across demanders. This bimodal distribution of consumer preferences is similar to the demand specification used in Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (1997) . As those authors point out, the advantage of this specification over the assumption that (α i , β i ) are i.i.d. normally distributed across consumers (as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995) is that preferences across distance and hospital characteristics are allowed to be correlated. For instance, demanders who are more willing to travel to a hospital with high high-tech service quality may also be more willing to travel to one with high ordinary service quality.
One can think of each point of support in this discrete distribution as representing a demander with different tradeoff, so that the probability of each point of support represents the percentage of that type of demander in the population. With richer individual-level data than Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (1997) , I am further able to allow the probability of each point of support, m i , to be a function of patient characteristics. Hence, the percentage of each type of demander with a different quality-distance tradeoff can vary with observed differences among patients. For these two types of demanders to be identified, I need to observe in the data demanders who bypass (or travel further away than) hospitals that are strongly preferred by other consumers (that is, hospitals perceived as having high quality on some dimension). I find evidence of this in my data and discuss it at the end of Section 6, where results of different specifications of the standard logit are presented.
The set of alternatives from which demanders choose. Finally, I need to define the set of choices available to each demander. From the utility specification in equation (5), patient i will go to hospital h if
I can use this inequality to help reduce the number of choices made available to each patient,
is very large, hospital h will not be chosen. This suggests two ways of limiting the set of choices: (i) using d ih , the distance to the hospital from the patient's home, or (ii) considering only those hospitals closest to the patient's home.
The model is estimated using both ways of defining the set of choices-(a) all hospitals within a 50-mile radius of the patient's home, (b) the nearest 50 hospitals, and (c) the nearest 20 hospitals to the patient's home. In all cases, patients who are not admitted to hospitals within their set of choices are excluded from the analysis. In the case of the 50-mile choice-set, this excludes 4% of patients in my sample (Table 3) . It is likely that such patients were away from home when the heart attack occurred, so that distance from home, the variable used to define the set of choices, poorly measures the transport costs incurred. Since one application of this model is to examine the size of hospital markets, I did not want to ex ante restrict each patient's set of choices and so defined the choice-set as being considerably larger than the set of alternatives from which I would expect patients to actually choose. Estimating the demand model using different geographic choice-sets provides a way of evaluating the logit specification. The IIA property of the logit model implies that relative probabilities of choosing two hospitals are unaffected by the other alternatives available to the individual. So if the model of demand is correctly specified, I expect the logit estimates not to change substantially when I use different definitions of the set of choices. The idea of using the reverse implication of IIA to develop a specification test for IIA is explained in Hausman and McFadden (1984) . This will also confirm that my estimates of the quality-distance tradeoff are not determined by an arbitrary choice-set definition.
Data
The patient data include all non-HMO Medicare beneficiaries who had been admitted to a hospital with the primary diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction (AMI or heart attack) in 1994. The data are drawn from Medicare claims information obtained from HCFA. HMO Medicare patients are excluded, as they may be limited in their choice of hospitals. HMO penetration into the Medicare market was low in 1994, so this excludes only a small proportion of patients. 9 There are a total of 158,720 patients in the dataset, excluding those who reside in rural counties. The average age of patients in the sample is about 76 years, and just under half of the sample is female. The percentage of black (non-Hispanic) patients is quite small (4%) for the subset of patients from California, Oregon, and Washington, reflecting the difference in the racial demographics across the country.
The hospital data are from the annual American Hospital Association (AHA) survey of all acute-care hospitals in the country, and the analysis includes the approximately 2,400 hospitals that are urban and nonfederal. Specialty hospitals like children's or psychiatric hospitals, as well as hospitals that admitted fewer than five Medicare heart attack patients, were excluded. Table  1 lists the variables and their descriptive statistics, and the Appendix contains definitions of the variables.
To reduce computational complexity, the results presented here use data from only three Pacific states: California, Oregon, and Washington. This includes a total of 14,374 heart attack patients. The majority of previous studies of hospital competition have used California data, in particular data from the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). Using the same regional data facilitates comparison of results.
I focus on urban patients and hospitals because the quality-distance tradeoff that determines demand is likely to differ between rural and urban areas. Rural patients would have to travel further on average than urban patients, but the costs of travelling the same distance, in terms of travel time, are likely to be lower because roads are more congested in urban areas. Hence, it is unclear how the impact of distance differs between rural and urban patients, and the former group is excluded in the empirical analysis.
Variables capturing hospital quality include both input measures, such as the number of nurses per bed, the range of specialized services offered, teaching status, and hospital size (the number of beds), as well as outcome measures, such as one-year mortality and one-year complication rates of patients admitted to the hospital. A complication is considered to have occurred if patients are readmitted within a year of their initial admission with the diagnosis of AMI, or with related diagnoses of ischemic heart disease or congestive heart failure. The use of patient outcomes as a proxy for quality is complicated by two problems. First, outcome measures are noisy. This is especially problematic for hospitals with a low patient volume. To address this, 10 years of data (1984 to 1993) were used to calculate the average (adjusted) oneyear mortality and complication rates of each hospital. The concern with pooling ten years of data is that hospital quality may change over the period. McClellan and Staiger (1999) examine this issue of noise in outcome measures, using very detailed patient-level data, and find that quality, as measured by mortality rates after a heart attack, is persistent over time.
The second problem with using outcome measures arises because certain hospitals may attract sicker patients, so that outcomes need to be adjusted for differences in the case-mix of hospitals. To control for selection, I use a fixed-effects framework, described in the Appendix. This adjusts for observed differences among patients (age, gender, race, and whether or not they were transferred). A more complete discussion of the selection problem is offered in Tay (2002) , which deals with the resulting selection bias by estimating a model of patient outcomes conditional on a behavioral model of hospital choice. That article finds that although patient choice does result in a selection bias when using outcomes to estimate hospital quality, the direction of the selection bias differs for different dimensions of quality. In particular, the more-severely ill patients are more likely to choose high-volume hospitals and less likely to choose hospitals offering specialized services like catheterization and revascularization. This is plausible because the most-severely ill are unlikely to receive these more intensive treatments. However, hospitals offering specialized services tend to be high-volume hospitals (Table 2 ). This may explain why the estimates of the same hospitalchoice model in Tay (2002) , using a more complete adjustment, are very similar to those obtained in this article, which estimates outcome measures as fixed effects. Since my focus here is on the a Volume refers to the number of heart attack patients admitted to the hospital in 1994.
model of hospital choice rather than on outcomes, and the choice model estimated has various other measures of quality, I use here a simpler treatment of outcomes. The outcome measures can be thought of as control variables to reduce unobserved quality, and given the simpler treatment of selection, the coefficients of the outcome measures are not used to infer demand elasticities. Hospital size, measured by the number of beds, varies considerably over the sample, with more than half the hospitals having fewer than 150 beds but 5% having more than 400 beds. About a fifth of the hospitals are teaching hospitals, and over 60% of the hospitals offer catheterization. All hospitals that have revascularization capabilities (angioplasty and bypass surgery) also have catheterization facilities. Hospitals that offer catheterization and revascularization treatmentswhich I term high-tech service quality-also tend to be teaching hospitals with a higher volume of patients, as shown in Table 2 .
Finally, to get a sense of distances travelled in the data, Table 3 shows that almost 80% of patients were admitted to hospitals within 10 miles of their homes. These statistics are consistent with those obtained in other studies using California state discharge data (White and Morrisey, 1998) . In the same table, we see that a little over half of all patients in the sample do not go to the hospital nearest to their home. This suggests that they were willing to travel four to five miles further on average (Table 4 ) to go to a hospital perceived as providing a higher quality of service. 
Results: demand estimates
The results from the logit are presented first, followed by those from the random-coefficients (mix-logit) model, which allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the quality-distance tradeoff of demanders. Although the logit specification is restrictive, it has the advantage of being tractable and has been commonly used in the hospital-choice literature. Estimating both models allows me to compare the estimates of the logit and mix-logit, and to assess these past approaches. Standard errors in all cases were corrected to account for the use of adjusted mortality and complication rates in the logit estimation, following Murphy and Topel (1985) . Both models were estimated using maximum-likelihood estimators.
Estimates of the logit. The estimates of the logit, shown in Table 5 , are generally as expected. In all the specifications estimated, the distance coefficient is negative and significant, while the coefficient of square of distance is positive. This suggests that patients are less likely to go to further hospitals and that distance enters the demander's objective function nonlinearly. Other specifications, like log(distance) and √ distance, were also estimated, and this finding persists. Quality is also an important determinant of hospital choice. The coefficients on catheterization and revascularization, which describe high-tech service quality, and other quality measures, like hospital size and staff-per-bed ratios, are positive and significant. Larger hospitals that have more staff per bed and provide a wider range of specialized services are preferred. The coefficients of the outcome measures of quality suggest that patients prefer hospitals with lower mortality rates. Although the coefficient on the linear mortality term is positive, that on the squared term is negative, and the effect is negative for all relevant ranges of mortality rates. However, hospitals with the lowest and highest complication rates are preferred. Since severely ill patients who do not die are likely to go on to have complications, a high complication rate may not be an indication of low quality, and may explain this result. The coefficient on teaching status is negative, implying that once all the other hospital characteristics are controlled for, patients are less likely to choose teaching hospitals. Specifications that included a variable indicating whether or not a hospital had a cardiac intensive care unit were also estimated. The coefficient on this variable was found to be small and insignificant. This is probably because the presence of a cardiac intensive care unit is highly correlated with the other quality variables included in the model, like having catheterization and revascularization facilities, so this variable was excluded in the preferred specifications presented.
The effect of patient characteristics on a patient's probability of selecting a hospital is also as expected. Older patients and female patients have a more negative coefficient on distance, suggesting that they are less willing to travel. This is consistent with the fact that heart attack symptoms differ between men and women. For instance, studies have found that female heart attack patients were less likely to experience chest pains than their male counterparts . This may lead female patients to underestimate the severity of their illness. The coefficients on the quality variables are smaller in magnitude for women and older patients, reinforcing the Number of observations 11,365 12,561 * * Significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. a ∂(P)/∂(distance) is calculated at mean probability and a distance of 10 miles. b Distance is measured in hundreds of miles, and Number of Beds in '00 of beds. c Calculated using 1984-1993 data and adjusted for case-mix. finding that younger, male patients are more willing to trade off distance for quality. Many of the variables interacted with race are insignificant, as only a small percentage of the patients in the dataset are black. Alternative functional-form specifications of both patient and hospital characteristics were also estimated, and these results were found to be robust.
Estimates of the random-coefficients logit or mix-logit. The mix-logit retains the structure of the logit but allows the coefficients in the model to be drawn from a discrete probability distribution with two points of support, which I refer to as "branch 1" and "branch 2" in the discussion and tables. This allows for the quality-distance tradeoff to differ across patients, beyond those differences associated with observed characteristics of patients.
The results of two different specifications of the mix-logit are shown in Table 6 . The probability of being drawn from the first point of support (branch 1) is given by
where ω 1 and ω 2 are the estimated parameters that are listed at the bottom of Table 6 . Various different specifications of the mix-logit were estimated. In all, the standard errors on the hospital characteristics interacted with race were very large, as only 3.9% of the patients included in the estimation are black. The preferred specification presented drops variables that are interacted with race. Also, it restricts the coefficients on the quality variables to be the same in branches 1 and 2, as I found that allowing the distance coefficients alone to vary between the two branches was sufficient to capture the difference in the quality-distance tradeoff between patients that each branch measures. (The Vuong (1989) test for nonnested hypotheses was used to compare the different specifications.)
In all the specifications, I find that the probability of choosing a hospital decreases with distance and increases with quality. Also, older and female patients are less willing to travel, and the coefficients were in general similar in sign to those of the logit specification. The coefficients on distance, however, differ considerably between the two branches. Distance enters linearly and negatively in branch 1, while in branch 2, the coefficient on the distance variables is much smaller in magnitude, and the coefficient on the square term is positive and significant. The estimates suggest that some demanders have a substantially different quality-distance tradeoff. For the 50-nearest choice-set specification, the coefficients on distance imply that an extra 10 miles decreases the probability of choice by 9% in branch 1, but by .8% in branch 2. It appears that demanders represented by branch 2 are willing to travel considerably further. This is surprising given the emergency nature of this diagnosis, where a delay in treatment can significantly worsen patient outcomes.
One obvious explanation for the difference in the valuation of distance is that the patient may not be at home when the heart attack occurs. The distance variable captures the distance between the patient's home and the hospital. Since most Medicare beneficiaries are retired, it is likely that they are at or near home when they suffer the heart attack. However, some of them may be away from home for various reasons, so that distance from home poorly measures travel costs. This interpretation of the estimates suggests that 14% of patients (the probability of branch 2) in the sample are not at home at the time of the heart attack. This finding is consistent with reports using a similar sample of patients, where about 15% of patients were admitted from a site other than home or outpatient clinic.
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Another finding is that age shifts π, the probability of branch 1. The coefficient on age, ω 2 , in π is positive and significant, suggesting that older patients are more likely to be in branch 1, where distance has a large negative impact on choice. This is consistent with the interpretation that the two branches capture the difference in the location of patients when the heart attack occurs. Older patients are less likely to be travelling and away from home, so they have a higher probability of being in branch 1. Hence, age appears to have two effects. First, older people care more about distance, or have higher transport costs than younger patients. Second, older people are more likely to be at or near home when the heart attack occurs. Specifications with different age categories were also estimated, and the findings were unchanged. I also tried including gender and race in the probability parameter, but the coefficients were small and insignificant, so only age was included in the final specification.
Finally, the difference in the mix-logit estimates when different choice-sets are used is also consistent with the interpretation that branch 2 represents the patients who are away from home. Compared to the 50-nearest choice-set, the 50-mile choice-set includes more patients who are likely to be "away from home," since they bypassed 50 or more hospitals. Given that the analysis focuses on urban hospitals and patients, it would be surprising if none of those 50 hospitals were high-quality hospitals, so a likely explanation is that these patients were not at home when hospital care was sought.
11 Hence, it explains the higher estimated probability of branch 2, or being away from home, when the 50-mile choice-set is used. (From Table 6 , the probability of branch 1 in the 50-mile specification is 81%, compared to 86% for the 50-nearest specification.)
Logit estimates using different choice-sets. Comparing estimates of the logit using the two different choice-sets is also a check on the IIA property of the logit, as described in Section 4. IIA implies that adding or subtracting hospitals to the set of choices should not substantially change the parameter estimates if the logit specification is appropriate, and this specification check uses the reverse implication of IIA. In this demand model, IIA restricts the cross-demand elasticities between any two hospitals to be independent of the characteristics of a third hospital. If there are unobserved differences in the demander's valuation of distance that the observed patient characteristics do not capture, the logit will be unable to fully capture the substitution patterns. The logit estimates (Table 5 ) of the marginal effect of distance on probability of choice are −.41 for the 50-nearest choice-set specification and −.67 for the 50-mile choice-set specification. (The marginal effects are calculated at mean probabilities and a distance of 10 miles.) This considerable difference in the parameter estimates suggests that IIA fails here. In the case of the mix-logit (Table 6) , however, the difference in the estimates of the marginal effect of distance under the two choice-set specifications is smaller (−.92 and −1.12 respectively). By allowing for heterogeneity in the quality-distance tradeoff, the mix-logit, unlike the logit, does not fail this check of whether the IIA property is restrictive.
Estimating the model using alternative ways of limiting the set of choices also helps explain the variation in the data that identifies the random-coefficients framework. As discussed in Section 4, the random-coefficients specification of the choice model takes the form of a binary discrete distribution of the coefficients, which allows (i) observed patient characteristics to shift the distribution of coefficients and (ii) the tastes for distance and various measures of quality to be correlated. This is interpreted as estimating the preferences of two different types of demanders. To identify this two-point distribution, I need to observe demanders who do not choose closer high-quality hospitals, but are instead admitted to hospitals of comparable quality further away. Changing the set of choices alters not only the number of alternatives each patient has, but also the patients who are excluded from the analysis. For instance, going from the 20-nearest to the 50-nearest choice-set includes more patients who bypassed closer higher-quality hospitals, patients who will be interpreted as "away from home." Hence, the estimates of the simple logit using the 20-nearest choice-set should be closer to estimates for patients interpreted as being at home (branch 1) than those using the 50-nearest choice-set. Table 7 presents these estimates, and we see that the marginal effect of distance on choice for the 20-nearest choice-set is 1.15, closer to the estimates obtained using the mix-logit specification (.92 and 1.12 from Table 6 ).
I also estimated other specifications in which the set of choices is allowed to differ between Note: Full set of coefficients for column (1) is reported in Table 5 . * * Significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. a ∂(P)/∂(distance) is calculated at mean probability and a distance of 10 miles. b Distance in hundreds of miles.
the two branches of the mix-logit, and the coefficient estimates obtained remain similar to those reported. Also, results of all specifications estimated are consistent with both the intuition about the data that identifies the random-coefficients specification chosen and the interpretation that branch 2 represents patients who are away from home when they have their heart attack.
Conclusions about demand estimates. Overall, the demand estimates suggest that while spatial differentiation is important, patients are willing to incur the greater costs of travel to obtain a higher-quality service. The mix-logit, in which the estimated coefficients are drawn from a binary discrete distribution, is able to capture this quality-distance tradeoff. Unlike the logit, the mix-logit does not fail the check on the IIA property of the logit, and distance enters linearly into the objective function of demanders in the mix-logit estimates. The difference in the coefficients in the two branches of the mix-logit implies that 14% or more of the patients in the sample care much less about distance than the rest. I interpret the low valuation of distance as representing patients who are away from home when they suffer a heart attack. This gives a plausible explanation for why the demander would care little about travel distance or travel costs when delays in treatment can lead to considerably worse outcomes for heart attack patients.
The difference between the estimates of the logit and mix-logit shows the effect of allowing for heterogeneity across demanders in the quality-distance tradeoff. If branch 2 is interpreted as representing patients who are away from home, it is the coefficients of branch 1, and not of branch 2, of the mix-logit that should be used to estimate the quality-distance tradeoff of demanders. Comparing the results using the 50-nearest choice-set, the marginal effect of distance in branch 1 of the mix-logit is −.92 (column 1, Table 6 ), double that of the logit of −.41 (column 1, Table 6 ). This implies that the tradeoff between quality and distance is considerably underestimated by the logit model. For example, the logit estimates suggest that a patient is indifferent between a hospital in his same zip code that offers no catheterization services and one that is 2.4 miles away and offers catheterization services.
12 This same calculation using the coefficients of branch 1 of the mix-logit suggest that the catheterization hospital need only be 1.22 miles away for a patient to be indifferent.
The finding that travel costs do not overwhelm quality considerations implies that the observed heterogeneity in patient and hospital location can be used to estimate the following:
(i) The valuation of quality by patients. Since there are no prices, we can think of transport costs as the costs patients pay to go to a higher-quality hospital. In this case, the valuation of quality is in terms of how many miles they are willing to travel to obtain higherquality care, instead of in monetary terms. This question of how much patients value quality is not pursued here.
(ii) The importance of spatial and quality competition in this market, and the various elasticities of demand with respect to determinants of demand. The next section does this by examining the effect of unilateral changes in hospital quality.
Implications of demand estimates
To better understand the demand elasticities implied, I used the mix-logit estimates (in Table 6 ) to calculate the predicted changes in hospital demand that occur when hospitals alter their quality given the location of patients and hospitals. In doing so, I assume that (i) the number of heart attack patients, or total demand, is fixed, (ii) patient locations are as given in the 1994 data, and (iii) all other hospitals remain unchanged, ignoring the potential strategic responses.
Using the distinction made in Section 3 between ordinary and high-tech service quality, three types of quality changes are examined:
(i) A rise in high-tech service quality, specifically adoption of catheterization or revascularization services, which are characterized by high fixed costs and increasing returns to scale.
(ii) A 1% increase in nurses per bed, which gives own-and cross-demand elasticities with respect to ordinary service quality.
(iii) The effect of a hospital closure, which represents an all-inclusive measure of quality. A hospital closure is analytically equivalent to a fall in quality to the point that demand for that hospital is zero.
To illustrate the importance of spatial differentiation in this market, the changes in demand of nearby hospitals are broken down according to the quality of the hospital and the distances between hospitals. Also, the effects of increasing high-tech service quality are examined under different scenarios to highlight the importance of accurately quantifying patient valuation of quality, as well as of the quality and location of competitors, in determining demand responses to quality changes. Finally, hospitals differ considerably in size, so both the size-weighted average effects and the unweighted statistics are presented. The number of heart attack patients, rather than total number of beds, is used to proxy for hospital size. This is because the number of beds includes all general acute care beds, so that focusing on heart attack admissions alone gives a clearer idea of the distribution of these effects across different hospitals.
Effect of change in high-tech service quality. The effects of a hospital adopting catheterization or revascularization facilities are shown in Table 8 . Since hospitals with revascularization capabilities necessarily have a catheterization lab, the adoption decision of the hospital is a twostep process. First, the hospital decides whether to set up a catheterization lab, and next, it decides whether to have angioplasty and open-heart surgery (jointly referred to as revascularization) facilities. I find that the impact of adopting either of the technologies on the hospital's own predicted demand is substantial. The average hospital that is currently without either technology is predicted to gain 12 patients (64% increase in demand) upon obtaining a catheterization lab, while a hospital with a catheterization lab gains 21 patients (76% increase) if it sets up revascularization facilities. The changes in demand vary considerably across hospitals. Some hospitals experience a more than doubling of demand, while others gain less than one patient. Most of the patients gained by the hospital adopting new facilities are drawn from hospitals that are closest to it. The quality increase has almost no effect on hospitals 20 miles away. Overall, the estimated gain in demand with increases in high-tech service quality are considerable for most hospitals, lending support to one of the key assumptions of the hypothesized medical arms race between hospitals. The effects of a change in quality on predicted demand depend on the location and demographics of patients, as well as the quality and location of competitors. For example, a large increase in demand upon adoption of a high-tech service is a combination of (i) being in or near a densely populated area, or one in which patients highly value quality and (ii) having many hospitals of a lower quality located close by, so that patients are induced to choose the hospital with increased quality instead. In order to distinguish the effects of these factors, I consider the unilateral adoption of high-tech services under three different cases:
(a) All patients in the dataset who are under age 80 are treated as if they are exactly 80 years old. This change in patient demographics leads to a fall in the valuation of quality relative to distance.
(b) All hospitals located close to the hospital had already offered the additional procedures. This changes the extent of quality differentiation of hospitals.
(c) All nearby hospitals exit the market. This alters the location of competitors, and hence the spatial differentiation in the market.
In each case, I calculate the predicted demand for each hospital under the new case before and after the adoption, holding all other factors constant. The results are presented in Table 9 and are compared to the "base case" in which the location and characteristics of patients and hospitals remain as they were in 1994. When the valuation of quality relative to distance is reduced, by assuming that all patients 80 years and below become 80 years old, the increase in high-tech service quality leads to a smaller increase in demand. For the average hospital, offering catheterization procedures will lead to a predicted gain of 6 patients (11 for revascularization), only about half as much as in the base case. The difference in the quality-distance tradeoff between older and younger patients, which appears modest in the demand estimates, leads to a large difference in demand increases due to raising high-tech service quality. This suggests that the hospital choices of marginal patients at actual distances are very sensitive to the distribution of patients and their valuation of distance. Since travel is more costly for heart attack patients as compared to patients with other illnesses, the valuation of quality is likely to be higher for most other diagnoses. Hence, the increase in predicted demand with adoption of new technologies for other diagnoses could be even higher than the base case described here.
Next, I examine the effect of increasing the quality of competitors. The increase in demand upon adoption of either service is smaller than the base case if all the hospitals within 10 miles have already adopted the technology, and even smaller if all hospitals within 50 miles already offer the procedure, as fewer patients can be attracted away from neighboring hospitals. As expected, competitive incentives to adopt monotonically decline as more and more hospitals have the technology. The first adopter gets all of the patients who value quality highly and, hence, a much larger demand increase than the hospitals that later match its quality. 55% of the hospitals in the sample already had a catheterization lab in 1994, and 39% of the sample hospitals had revascularization facilities. This suggests that the business-stealing effects of increasing hightech service quality are substantial even when many of the hospitals already have the technology, which could lead to wasteful duplication of costly technologies.
The third case, in which the hospital is the only one within 10 or 50 miles, illustrates the effect of increasing the market power that a hospital derives from spatial differentiation. 50 miles is chosen as an extreme case, since I do not expect patients to travel 50 miles to seek medical care upon having a heart attack. When there are no other hospitals within 50 miles, adopting revascularization leads to a 13% increase in demand for the average hospital, smaller than the 43% of the 10-mile monopolist, which is in turn smaller than the 76% increase under the base case. With a large spatial monopoly, hospitals are less likely to increase high-tech service quality, since the spatial differentiation gives the hospital a high level of demand regardless of whether it offers high-tech services. Hence, it is distance rather than quality that dominates the hospital choice, and the increase in quality leads to smaller percentage increases in demand.
Overall, the effects of an increase in high-tech service quality presented in this subsection indicate that hospitals do gain a substantial number of patients when new technologies are adopted. The total benefit to the hospital of adoption includes the rise in reimbursements obtained by administering the new procedures to existing patients, as well as the increase in admissions that I estimate. Adding the business-augmenting effects to the estimated competitive or businessstealing effects makes the increases in revenues upon adoption even larger.
Effect of change in ordinary service quality. The effect of a 1% increase in the nurses per bed, which represents a rise in ordinary service quality, on the hospital's own demand is found to be substantial (Table 10) . If hospitals are grouped according to the number of beds and the facilities offered, we can observe that the own-demand elasticity is lower for hospitals identified as having lower quality-small hospitals that do not offer catheterization or revascularization procedures. The difference in elasticities between different hospital types suggests that the impact of increasing quality (the percentage changes in own demand) is greater when other aspects of quality are also raised.
The effect of the increase in own quality on other hospitals-the cross-elasticities of demand with respect to quality-is estimated separately for hospitals at different distances (Table 11 ). The effect falls by more than one-half with every 5-mile increase in distance between the two Note: Means are weighted by actual number of heart attack patients admitted to the hospital in 1994. a A high-quality hospital is one with more than 250 beds and with catheterization and revascularization capabilities, and a low-quality hospital is one with fewer than 100 beds and no catheterization or revascularization capabilities. All other hospitals are classified as mid-quality. hospitals. This suggests that quality competition is most intense among neighboring hospitals, and as distance increases, the transport costs cause quality differences to be less important.
Effect of a hospital closure. Finally, I consider the closure of a hospital, which is equivalent to a fall in all aspects of quality to the point that demand for that hospital is zero. Table 12 shows that most of the patients of a high-quality hospital that closed would substitute toward hospitals within 15 miles. From column 1, the average hospital within 5 miles of the closed hospital gains 13% of the patients of the closed hospital. As distance increases, this percentage falls rapidly, so that it becomes less than .5% for hospitals beyond 15 miles. If these percentages are broken down by the quality of the hospitals to which patients are diverted, columns 2-4, we see that high-quality neighbors gain the largest proportion of patients of the closed hospital. If we identify competitors of a hospital as those that a significant percentage of patients, for example more than 1%, would substitute toward, Table 12 suggests that mid-and high-quality hospitals within 15 miles should be included, but for low-quality hospitals, only those within 10 miles should be included. Hence, any measure of the competitive pressures of a hospital should account for the quality differences as well as the spatial differentiation.
The effect of a hospital closure in terms of the change in demand of other hospitals is presented in Table 13 . As before, we observe that the effect of closure on neighboring hospitals decreases Note: Percentages are averaged over all hospitals that fall within each distance category, and over the hypothesized closure of individual hospitals. Hence, the percentages would not add up to one since there is more than one hospital in each distance group. a High-quality hospitals are large (more than 250 beds) hospitals with catheterization and revascularization capabilities, and low-quality hospitals are small (fewer than 100 beds) with no catheterization or revascularization capabilities. All other hospitals are classified as mid-quality. a High-quality hospitals are large (more than 250 beds) hospitals with catheterization and revascularization capabilities, and low-quality hospitals are small (fewer than 100 beds) with no catheterization or revascularization capabilities.
rapidly with distance and becomes quite small beyond 20 miles. The costs of travel lead patients to substitute toward closer hospitals, so that spatial differentiation does reduce the competition between hospitals. For any distance category, the mean increase in the predicted number of patients (columns 1 and 3) is larger for high-quality than low-quality hospitals, implying that patients of the closed high-quality hospital are more likely to choose another high-quality hospital. However, if one compares the percentage changes in demand, columns 2 and 4, the changes are larger for low-quality hospitals because they have an average original demand of 18.2 patients, as compared to 66.8 patients for high-quality hospitals. If patients substitute away from the closed hospitals according to current market shares, the percentage changes in demand should be similar for the two types of hospitals. These results suggest that this is not the case, so that measuring market power based on market shares can be misleading.
Conclusion
This article examines the importance of quality differentiation in hospital care markets, which are also horizontally differentiated by geographic location. Using individual-level Medicare data on heart attack patients, I estimate a random-coefficients discrete-choice model of hospital demand. The estimates allow me to quantify the tradeoff between quality and distance that demanders make, and hence the importance of quality differentiation.
I find that quality and distance are important determinants of hospital choice. The tradeoff between quality and distance, as well as the valuation of different aspects of quality, varies with patient characteristics, so that measures of hospital competition should account for not only quality differences but also patient demographics. The logit, which is commonly used in the hospital-choice literature, underestimates the impact of distance on hospital choice. This is because the logit fails to allow for unobserved differences between patients, and the estimates of the random-coefficients model suggest that 14% or more of patients are considerably more willing to travel from their home to obtain hospital care. Since a delay in treatment after a heart attack can substantially worsen health outcomes, these patients who appear to care little about the distance of the hospital from their homes are interpreted as being away from home when the heart attack occurred. This interpretation is consistent with the finding that the age of patients reduces the probability that the valuation of distance is low, since younger patients are more likely to be away from home. The interpretation is also supported by statistics from detailed surveys of patients.
The demand estimates are used to examine unilateral increases in high-tech service quality (adoption of new technologies), ordinary service quality (staff-per-bed ratios), as well as hospital closures that represent all-inclusive reductions in quality. These changes are found to have substantial effects on hospital demand, suggesting that quality differences are important in determining the demand of hospitals and must be taken into account when estimating the effect of competition on hospital behavior. The effects of adopting new technologies were also examined under different cases. I find that modest reductions in the valuation of quality relative to distance lead to substantial reductions in hospital demand increases when new services are added. This suggests that marginal changes in hospital demand due to quality changes are very sensitive to the valuation of distance, highlighting the importance of correctly measuring the tradeoff between quality and distance of demanders. Similarly, when the neighboring hospitals have already adopted the technology, predicted increases in demand from adopting fall. This implies that demand gains are likely to be very strong for early adopters-those able to considerably differentiate their product's quality. The finding that own-quality elasticities of demand are higher when the hospital is large and offers catheterization and revascularization procedures implies that there are interactions between these different aspects of quality as well. In the case of a hospital closure, demand is found to shift disproportionately toward higher-quality hospitals and not according to prior market shares. This suggests that using existing market shares as a measure of market power may be misleading.
Overall, the increased revenues or benefits to the hospital of raising quality are found to be considerable, suggesting that hospitals may be in a medical arms race, as has been hypothesized in the hospital-competition literature. These gains in revenues need to be weighed against the costs of raising quality, to give a complete picture of whether hospitals will provide higher-quality care. Thus, without additional information about costs and patient benefits, the estimates in this article cannot conclude whether hospital incentives to provide quality are too strong or too weak from a social viewpoint, or whether there is wasteful duplication of costly high-tech services. Finally, this article focuses on the demand substitution patterns of heart attack patients, who are likely to be less willing to travel to higher-quality hospitals than patients with other diagnoses. I expect that distance matters less and quality more in other diagnoses for which care is less urgently sought, so that the intensity of quality competition and the effects found here are probably even greater for other diagnoses. Note: All the data are from 1994, except for mortality and complication rates.
These mortality fixed effects are calculated using data of the patients admitted to the particular hospital in the prior years, 1984-1993, rather than 1994 . If 1994 mortality rates had been used, patients would affect hospital quality through their hospital choices. Using mortality rates from prior years avoids this endogeneity. The same method is used to calculate the complication fixed effect, where complications are defined to have occurred if there was a second heart attack admission, or a subsequent admission for ischemic heart disease or chronic heart failure.
